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Abstract 
This paper investigates the current turbulent state of copyright in the digital age, and 
explores the viability of alternative compensation systems. The paper critically appraises 
the increased recourse to digital rights management (DRM) technologies, which are 
designed to restrict access to and usage of digital content. Considerable technical 
challenges associated with DRM systems have necessitated increasingly aggressive 
recourse to the law. A number of controversial aspects of copyright enforcement are 
discussed and contrasted with those arising from alternative levy-based compensation 
systems. This paper undertakes consideration of alternative models for managing the 
copyright bargain in the digital era. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The digital age promises innumerable opportunities and benefits for society, but for 
intellectual property (IP) regimes originating in the analogue era it presents many 
fundamental challenges. Much debate revolves around how to shape modern laws and 
digital technologies to retain existing IP regimes, so that traditional commercial and 
regulatory models can live on. Relatively little is said about alternatives based on the 
premise that current IP regimes need redesigning to better suit the digital world. 
 
Copyright law was designed to create a regime providing financial incentive and 
recognition for creators to thereby encourage a rich supply of IP for the benefit of society. 
Due to the ‘public good’ qualities of art, movies, music and literature, the dilemma has 
been that, unless creators and producers are somehow fairly rewarded for their efforts, IP 
production is likely to decline. Without some form of intervention, the ‘non-rivalrous’ 
(use by one person does not diminish enjoyment by others) and ‘non-excludable’ 
(providing availability to some does not prevent access by others) characteristics of 
public goods may undermine incentives for commodification and commercial production. 
Taxation is one common mechanism applied to overcome production disincentives where 
societal benefits are perceived to warrant government intervention. Copyright law, dating 
back to the Statute of Anne in 1709, was the novel solution specifically applied to creative 
works. Copyrights are basically a legal set of exclusive rights provided to content owners, 
balanced by a carefully considered set of exceptions to equalise public interests in the 
overall bargain. 
 
Such copyright systems worked well while the resources required to produce and 
distribute copied material were relatively expensive, and copy degradation was 
unavoidable. These deterrents no longer exist in the digitally networked content 
environment. Inevitably, the advent of digital technologies and the internet have led to a 
dramatic escalation of copyright infringement, more commonly — and misleadingly — 
referred to as piracy. Since the invention and widespread deployment of photocopiers in 
the early 1960s, and the subsequent development of home taping, video recorders, and so 
on, copyright problems have dramatically intensified. The principal industry response has 
focused on the development of digital rights management (DRM). Many definitions of 
DRM proliferate, but it can generally be described as the set of technical and legal 
mechanisms applied to help control access to, and distribution of, copyrighted and other 
protected material in the digital environment. 
 Despite ongoing research and developments in DRM, it will always by nature remain a 
subset of possible deterrents for copyright infringement. A key question, with this 
inherent limitation in mind, is whether or not the costs and repercussions of DRM justify 
its status as the primary solution to the current dilemma. Laws which criminalise 
significant sections of the population should only be implemented when benefits clearly 
outweigh social costs. Laws which are regularly broken by a wide cross-section of the 
public, to which authorities frequently turn a blind eye, are most likely in need of change. 
 
This paper compares two different approaches to handling the dilemma of IP in the 
digital world. The first maintains the current copyright regime, while taking stronger 
measures to lock up IP in order to sustain it. This entails increased use of technological 
and legal rights enforcement mechanisms. The second option is to change the current 
copyright regime to adapt to the digital environment where copying, reuse and 
repurposing of content are widespread and possess few, if any, technological barriers, and 
using alternative compensation systems such as levies to suitably reward digital content 
creators and distributors. 
 
Had the initial instigators of copyright law used some taxation mechanism to achieve the 
goals of copyright protection, we would have an entirely different scenario today. Drastic 
changes of an entrenched regime require firm evidence to illustrate that their overall 
benefits are real and worthwhile. Prototype alternative IP systems are therefore necessary 
both to collect such evidence, and to experiment with system design. By describing the 
worsening problems in the current regime whilst facing the difficulties of implementing 
alternative compensation schemes, it is hoped that further investigation into the problems, 
and support for alternative IP systems, will be encouraged. 
 
It is possible that the scale of current problems might have persuaded early decision-
makers to rethink the copyright and IP regimes. This paper aims to contrast benefits and 
costs of levy-based systems alongside current approaches. If alternative IP systems can 
better maximise technological and social benefits in the digital age, whilst fulfilling the 
goals behind copyright law, such options ought to be explored more fully. Investigating 
alternative directions rather than remaining entrenched in an increasingly shaky regime 
may present a route with fewer obstacles and greater promise for the future. 
 
Problems faced by the current copyright regime 
 
In order to sustain the current copyright regime in the environment of widespread ease of 
infringement, the technical solution has typically involved greater use of compliant end-
user devices, with incorporated virtual machines capable of enforcing content licence 
restrictions. This is not an easy task since such DRM systems will require client 
rendering devices with trusted processing, input and output paths (Lacy et al., 1997). 
Required modifications to current PC architecture will therefore affect motherboards, 
CPU, display and input devices. The technical complexities necessary for these types of 
DRMs must make them costly measures. The idea is that users will be unable to tamper 
with a device without compromising its ability to attest its compliance or trustworthiness 
(Schechter et al., 2003). Compliant devices can be relied upon to communicate with 
content providers, using remote attestation mechanisms built into hardware. Embedded 
unique private keys will enable identification and authentication of both devices and 
users. Non-compliant or compromised devices, unable to convince content providers of 
their trustworthiness to comply with licensing conditions, will consequently have reduced 
content access and usage freedom.  
 
Greater use of Technological Protection Measures (TPMs), enabling end-to-end content 
protection via closed systems, is currently a favoured solution for copyright owners. If 
they can maintain greater usage control over their digital content, then pay-per-usage 
business models can be applied to raise revenue from their works. Their focus is on 
sustaining current copyright regimes and retaining existing lucrative creative industry 
business models via increased use of TPMs combined with aggressive legal pursuit of 
parties violating copyright, contract and controversial anti-circumvention (of protection 
mechanisms) laws. The trend is towards online delivery of content to consumers subject 
to a number of conditions and with restrictions. Digital Rights Enforcement (DRE) 
systems can attach usage rules to electronically distributed content, along with security 
mechanisms designed to enforce them. If they fail, as they eventually typically do, the 
law is waiting in the wings to back them up. Users attempting to circumvent protection 
measures, or remove embedded copyright information, are in nearly all cases breaking 
the law. Users who interfere with TPMs and create infringing copies can technically be 
tracked and exposed to litigation. Legal backup now goes further than this. Laws now 
prevent the creation, manufacture or marketing of circumvention tools that are designed 
to compromise technical security measures. This defence-in-depth approach to maintain 
the current copyright regime has numerous far-reaching implications. 
 
Diminished consumer privacy 
 
DRM technologies provide functional capability to monitor consumer viewing, listening 
and reading habits. An excerpt from a Microsoft definition of DRM clearly illustrates this 
point: ‘DRM is a set of technologies content owners can use to protect their copyrights 
and stay in closer contact with their customers’ (Microsoft, 2003, emphasis added). The 
carefully phrased language disguises potential privacy-invading monitoring capability in 
a consumer-centric spin. This example of slanted vendor marketing is an illustration of 
the widespread practice of ‘perception engineering’, whereby an impression of 
inevitability about corroding consumer rights is encouraged. 
 
Because valuable collected data can be used for market research, there is a real incentive 
for consumer monitoring. This represents an unacceptable erosion of personal privacy for 
many consumers. It was respect for consumer privacy in their own homes that caused 
Germany to be the first initiator of levy-based systems for private copying (Hugenholtz et 
al., 2003). 
 
A number of significant concerns surrounding DRM systems have been persuasively 
articulated by privacy advocates (Cohen, 2003). Although pressure from consumer 
groups and academics is likely to result in some onus to embed privacy protection 
measures, because monitoring capabilities are inherent in DRM technologies, there can 
be no guarantees that privacy enhancing technology (PET) mechanisms are actually 
adhered to. This tendency has been illustrated in the area of web privacy policies. With or 
without their knowledge or consent, DRM technologies have the potential to invade the 
personal privacy of consumers. Moving into the realm of paranoia, DRM mechanisms 
could conceivably assist politically motivated entities to survey consumer device hard 
drives. Critics such as John Perry Barlow argue that: ‘Digital Rights Management today 
is Political Rights Management tomorrow’ (cited in Krempl, 2003). 
 
Reduced innovation potential 
 
Trusted platforms enabling compliant systems have ‘black box’ characteristics that might 
severely impact upon technological innovation by shielding hidden interfaces under the 
guise of security. ‘Trusted’ technologies give software creators the ability to make and 
lock in decisions about who their applications can interoperate with (Anderson, 2003). 
The tamper-resistant nature of trusted systems implies that any user producing 
interoperable software beyond the scope specified must have broken the law by 
circumventing a TPM. This feature of trusted platform technology challenges future 
interoperability and innovative adaptation potential. The current capability to adapt 
software and promote open systems has provided many benefits to date, so any legislative 
efforts that hold back technological innovation potential might have inconceivably far-
reaching consequences. 
 
Proliferating online piracy, particularly in the music industry, has led affected 
stakeholders to seek out methods to attack peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks and 
applications. But the consequences of impeding ongoing development of potentially 
beneficial P2P technologies, which some have claimed to be ‘both the origin and the 
future of the Internet’ (Hausmann, 2002: 210), should not be underestimated. 
Instead of sabotaging P2P networks, they could instead be harnessed to assist with the 
implementation of new business models. The effectiveness of ‘viral marketing’ practices, 
whereby users promote and share material with friends, might usefully be applied to 
create more efficient content delivery networks. 
 Spoiled content fidelity 
 
Two core technologies used for DRM are encryption and digital watermarking. 
Encryption is, of course, essential to prevent snooping during transit and while in storage. 
But to be rendered, content must eventually be decrypted, so digital watermarks are 
designed to remain unobtrusively and persistently hidden within content. The threat to 
content fidelity is that persistence can only be achieved at the cost of unobtrusiveness. A 
prominent characteristic of digital watermarking is the existence of numerous 
unavoidable tradeoffs, affecting cost, complexity and watermark perceptibility (Craver et 
al., 2000). The likelihood for content fidelity to noticeably deteriorate is increased when 
robustness is prioritised, a consequence not necessarily in the best interest of either 
consumers or creators. 
 
Extensive research activity has been dedicated towards developing new ‘robust’ 
watermarking methods capable of sustaining a subset of typical processing, filehandling 
and editing functions, and also malicious attacks. File compression in particular presents 
significant challenges for watermark designers. When robustness is a primary goal, the 
aim is to insert marks in a manner that will resist accidental or malicious removal without 
simultaneous destruction of the work. But the current— and arguably permanent — state 
of watermarking technology is that any existing technique is vulnerable to attack. There 
are considerable differences in resilience and implementation practicality amongst 
modern watermarking schemes, and ongoing research continues to generate improved 
schemes and new attacks. Because the current copyright regime creates incentives for 
attackers, production of tolerant robust watermarking techniques is currently a high 
priority. 
 
Ongoing commercial piracy 
 
The current copyright regime invites commercial piracy to flourish, with a motivation 
proportional to market size and content value. If content prices are inflated and access 
restricted, then piracy incentives will be fuelled. History has continued to demonstrate 
that, with sufficient motivation to attack, any TPM will eventually be broken (Biddle et 
al., 2002). Anti-circumvention laws will not deter commercial pirates, who have flagrant 
disregard for the law. Any real attempt to sufficiently deter determined, resourceful 
pirates requires strong security measures which are generally too expensive for use in 
protecting low-value content. Information security standards outline how appropriate 
security measures are selected following a risk assessment process, including a cost-
benefit analysis. It is widely realised that no system can guarantee perfect security, so 
minimisation rather than elimination of commercial piracy is a realistic goal, but only 
with accompanying increased costs for consumers. Layers of TPMs, including numerous 
failures, such as the content scrambling system (CSS) protection on DVDs, noteworthy 
for its widespread use and poor design, tend to lead to escalating costs that are ultimately 
passed on to consumers. Considerable resources are expended in design and 
implementation of TPMs, particularly complex watermarking technologies. Although 
these may result in some reduction of commercial piracy, the subsequent reduction in 
consumer acceptance due to rising costs and decreased convenience must be taken into 
account. 
 
Greater imbalance in the copyright bargain between copyright holders and users 
 
There has been much commentary on the trend towards erosion of ‘fair use’ provisions, 
to the detriment of the consumer rights side of the copyright bargain. The set of 
exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners were carefully crafted by 
lawmakers to create the desired balance between owners and the general public. One of 
the problems arising from attempts to apply technological means to protect copyrights is 
that it is considered impossible to program fair use exceptions into DRM systems. This is 
because fair use is a complex legal mechanism, with outcomes dependent on individual 
aspects of each case. Clearly, case-by-case decisions cannot be defined algorithmically 
for programming into DRM systems. This is likely to reduce consumer capability to 
exercise fair use rights if DRM systems remove operation of these copyright exceptions, 
thereby tipping the delicate copyright balance further against consumers (Burk and 
Cohen, 2001). 
 
Copyright-based industries are an extremely powerful force in the world today. 
They represent one of the most rapidly growing sectors of the world economy in terms of 
GDP, job growth and international trade (Howkins, 2001; Siwek, 2002; Cutler & 
Co/CIRAC, 2003). These copyright industries have had sufficient power and influence to 
successfully lobby for tougher laws, including most controversially the new anti-
circumvention provisions introduced by the WCT (World IP Organisation Copyright 
Tribunal), and enacted by most member states. Such laws provide even ineffective TPMs 
artificial muscles by simply prohibiting their circumvention. Consumers increasingly are 
becoming comparatively powerless stakeholders in the copyright bargain. 
 
Alternative compensation systems 
 
A contrasting option to the application of DRM systems outlined above would involve 
changing the current copyright regime to allow free private copying and online 
downloading in exchange for levies paid on those devices and services that enable it. 
Following a brief history of levy systems for IP, some alternative compensation models 
are next described and characterised. 
 
Existing levy-based systems for IP 
 
There are already in existence around the world, primarily for music and reprography, 
over 40 private copying exemption systems that use revenue gathered via levies on blank 
storage media and/or recording devices to distribute amongst content owners (creators 
and producers) (Australian Copyright Council, 2001). 
 
Copyright protection did not historically extend to private copying by individuals, but as 
the distinction between public acts and private acts began to blur with the advent of 
sound and video recording equipment, regulation of private use became inevitable. It was 
in response to the fact that infringement claims against individuals creating private home 
copies were considered unenforceable, due to a person’s right to privacy in their own 
home, that levies were first introduced (Hugenholtz et al., 2003). To compensate rights 
holders for the common practice of private home copying, the German Supreme Court 
initiated a statutory equipment levy in 1965. Other member states of the EU soon 
followed suit with variations of the German regime. 
 
Existing levy systems suffer from a number of flaws and, like all IP systems, need to 
adjust to the realities of the digital age. There are a number of proposals to extend the 
breadth of regulated levy systems to incorporate more forms of digital content and 
distribution channels, including the internet. The existence of public libraries illustrates a 
long-held community belief in providing free access to expressions of human creativity 
and knowledge for all people. Public libraries are funded by government taxes, and are 
already evolving to provide access to digital media as well as books. It has been strongly 
argued that expressions of human creativity and knowledge, easily accessible due to 
modern digital networked technologies, have public good characteristics, and hence fall 
into the category of goods eligible for regulation by government (Fisher, 2004). 
Following this argument, it seems reasonable that the public library concept, traditionally 
focused primarily on books, could justifiably be extended and broadened to encompass 
all forms of digital content. 
 
Fisher’s levy based model 
 
William Fisher, the Hale and Dorr Professor of Intellectual Property Law at 
Harvard University, and Director of the Berkman Centre for Internet and Society, is one 
of the leading proponents of alternative models. Fisher has proposed a government-
administered compensation system, encompassing free online access to music and 
movies. Fisher’s model addresses the growing problem of P2P sharing, not currently 
encompassed by private copying levy systems. He proposes taxing all goods and services 
that are used to gain access to music and film. This includes recording equipment, storage 
media and ISP services, either to download files or to stream recordings from the internet. 
Fisher (2004) includes initial rough estimates of percentage revenue losses that the music 
and movie industries would incur should free, unlimited non-commercial file sharing be 
introduced, aggregated into an overall US tax rate for 2004 of 15.88 per cent on the sales 
price of targeted items and services necessary to fairly compensate affected businesses. 
 
In the Fisher system, content owners are paid their proportional share of collected tax 
revenues based on the relative popularity of their work, ascertained by estimating the 
frequency of consumption. It is this aspect of any levy-based model that is particularly 
vulnerable. Any system reliant upon automated online counting is a prime target for 
compromise via potential fraudulent ‘ballot-stuffing’ code, by dishonest content owners 
wishing to acquire more than their fair share of the revenue pool. A number of alternative 
mechanisms to estimate popularity are being discussed, including the use of sufficiently 
extensive customer surveys and voting tokens. While there are many specialist customer 
survey organisations well practised in applying sampling techniques to gather and 
analyse data, two other problems facing the Fisher system and related models are the 
problem of achieving incorruptible popularity estimates, and the possibility of tax rates 
rising over time due to increasing corrosion of affected business revenues. Technological 
advances are likely to further increase the popularity of online downloading, resulting in 
reduced spending through traditional channels, and an undermining of traditional forms 
of audience/user aggregation that have been developed for commercial clients. 
 
Alternative compensation models 
 
Most ‘alternative’ IP models focus to some degree on encompassing free access to, and 
non-commercial copying of distributed and networked content, accessed by online or 
other means. In Brazil, for example, the Ministry of Culture is supporting a new initiative 
to put all locally produced culture into a central pool made freely available online, to help 
promote local artists and maintain Brazil’s cultural heritage. 
 
Alternative compensation systems can be run on a voluntary basis, along the lines of 
existing collecting societies, whereby contributed content is centrally administered, 
stored and made available to the public. Such a closely regulated system would use some 
combination of techniques to monitor the relative popularity of contributed works. 
Consumers could then access content either online or from distributed physical outlets, 
such as public libraries or educational institutions. Users would then be free to store and 
copy content obtained from the system at will, for their own private, non-commercial use. 
Any pooled revenue collected by a voluntary system is divided and distributed according 
to relative popularity weighting, after administration costs are deducted. 
 
In such a system, content would be centrally registered and marked with a unique 
identifier, such as the DOI (Digital Object Identifier). This would allow easy tracking, 
administering, indexing and unique identification of any contributed content. 
If content owners were convinced of the merits of the system, and of its capability to 
provide a fair and regular income, they would be more likely to wish to opt into a 
voluntary scheme. This means that any levy rates applied must be sufficient to generate 
the necessary revenue pool needed to attract content owners in. This opt-in style of 
alternative model is likely to be more palatable to the copyright and creative industries 
than compulsory schemes, since it leaves more choices open. Content owners who prefer 
to protect their works using TPMs can then remain free to do so. 
 
Challenges for and characteristics of levy-based systems  
 
Levy rates 
 
 Levy-based systems place significant responsibility upon decision-makers, particularly 
regarding the setting of levy rates and revenue distribution allocations. Because of their 
impact on quantity of content contributed, as well as on consumer support, levy rates are 
an especially delicate balancing mechanism for voluntary systems. Levy rates might be 
kept reasonably modest, since content owners of popular material have opportunity to 
augment their revenue via familiar value-add methods, such as live performances, cinema 
attendance and merchandising. Individual levy rates on eligible devices and services 
might be more fairly imposed based on analysis of their typical usage for activities 
involving accessing, rendering, storing, copying and redistributing digital content. 
Targeted devices and services could then be taxed on sales prices, weighted according to 
typical usage, as determined by regular consumer surveys. 
 
One of the common objections raised about levy systems is that levies would still be paid 
on devices, disks or services even if they are not actually used to access, render or copy 
copyrighted material. Although valid, this criticism can be partially reduced by 
illustrating that, on average, consumers currently spend more on recording entertainment 
than they would pay in levies (Fisher, 2004). Industry sectors whose products become 
targeted by levies, including consumer electronics and ISPs, are likely to object, and to 
pass on increased prices to customers. Free access to content will arguably create 
additional demand for such products, and offset disadvantages somewhat. 
 
Content marking 
 
Alternative compensation systems require minimal DRM technology, primarily to mark 
content for identification purposes. A unique identifying sequence, such as the DOI, can 
be persistently embedded in digital content using watermarking technology. By 
restricting the watermark payload to the unique identifier, tradeoffs against perceptibility 
and robustness are reduced. With extensive research underway in the digital 
watermarking field, many different techniques of varying degrees of practicality already 
exist. Watermark method selection depends on the specific requirements of the 
application. A key issue for most creators is to achieve recognition for their work, thereby 
satisfying their moral right of attribution. For this application, techniques that 
‘redundantly’ apply a watermark repeatedly throughout the content would be particularly 
useful. This feature would mean that the minimal invisible/inaudible mark is detectable 
from even small pieces of a work, making it relatively easy for creators of derived works 
to incorporate suitably identified samples of others’ works within their own 
compositions. There could then be potential to build plug-ins for publishing applications 
to read, extract or insert watermarks, and also possibly to perform rights database look-
ups to provide further details. 
 Embedding an identifier, such as DOI, into the content itself provides capability to easily 
hook into some distributed system of rights databases to extract additional information. 
Thus the embedded DOI links to records holding comprehensive (yet generally static) 
content metadata, creator and ownership details, including those of any contained derived 
works. 
 
Watermarks have many potential applications, but a number of inherent limitations. 
The most challenging aspect of watermarking is probably striving for robustness 
(particularly against malicious attacks). While robustness is a priority for DRMs 
protecting content in the current copyright regime, it loses importance in a system where 
content is ‘free’. With significantly diminished incentive for deliberate removal of 
watermarks, content fidelity becomes less of an inevitable tradeoff. 
 
Revenue distribution 
 
One of the significant challenges for any levy system is determining how to distribute 
collected taxes fairly. Relative values of different genres of creative work must be 
factored in: clearly a movie is ‘worth’ more than a song, because it costs significantly 
more to produce. In the current system, market forces efficiently determine the relative 
value of entertainment genres. Once the revenue pool is divided amongst genres, 
distribution to individual owners is based on relative popularity estimates. 
 
Alternative systems prototypes 
 
Supporting evidence to justify redesign of the current copyright system in the form of 
working alternative prototypes is required. Low-cost prototypes can be used to prove the 
concept whilst providing additional community benefits to justify their existence, such as 
providing support for new and upcoming local creators. Access to an ‘alternative’ 
prototype would easily attract content from new emerging creators and free content 
would obviously be willingly contributed. As a prototype gains exposure and popularity, 
and establishes a reputation amongst content creators, higher value content is more likely 
to be contributed to the system. Initially, a prototype might be funded by some form of 
grant, but to be commercially viable, the system would need to collect sufficient revenue 
to cover administration costs and to allow for modest payments to owners of relatively 
popular content. Adjustment of the levy rates applied will then partially determine the 
level of higher value content that is attracted into the system, and catalyse expansion of 
the prototype. Data and social trends can then be collected, monitored and documented to 
demonstrate the viability and challenges of alternative compensation systems. 
 
Piracy and privacy in levy-based systems 
 
Commercial piracy would effectively be eliminated by a system that provides contributed 
content freely to all taxpayers. Without the considerable technical challenge of somehow 
having to disallow copying, fewer restricting TPMs are needed, so in a levy-based regime 
not only the content, but also technological devices, would be ‘unlocked’ and set free. 
 
Fewer TPMs, and free private copying, remove the need for legal back-up to seek out, 
catch and prosecute infringers. Along with the obvious cost savings, consumers can 
maintain anonymity to a far greater degree, without the danger of having their viewing, 
listening and reading habits being monitored and tracked by external third parties. 
 
Creative artists have greater influence 
 
It is likely that a greater percentage of CI revenues would go directly to creators in a 
system eliminating many considerable overheads present in the current copyright regime. 
Regime change enabling greater ease for new artists to contribute or modify existing 
works and reach an audience would benefit creators as well as consumers. In the digital 
age, dramatic reductions in costs of production and distribution should in theory lead to 
an increased variety of artists and works. Without the controlling and editing roles of 
many of the current regime ‘middlemen’, anyone can publish and share creative material. 
Thus a levy-based system turns the world into one of controlled cultural anarchy. 
 Conclusion 
 
As digital rights enforcement technologies continue to develop and roll out into the 
marketplace, opportunities to redesign the IP system slip away. Because much is at stake 
for consumers, it is important to open up valid debate to consider alternatives to the 
struggling copyright regime. DRM technologies may have a crucial role to play in the 
commercial sector for protecting high-value and critical content, where greater content 
usage control is required and inherent drawbacks are warranted. It is not so clear, 
however, that these developing technologies are appropriately applied to protect all IP. A 
primary goal for copyright owners of most entertainment content is widespread 
distribution and exposure, primarily to acquire greater recognition and therefore revenue-
earning potential. This goal is not assisted by technologies designed to restrict usage and 
access. 
 
It is important to carefully consider costs and societal repercussions caused by applying 
DRM technologies to control rampant copyright infringement so easily performed in the 
digital age. Although the right to make copies is central to the integrity of the current 
copyright system, it has been suggested that, due to the very ‘centrality of copying to use 
of digital technology, reproduction is no longer an appropriate way to measure 
infringement’ (Litman, 2002:132). The time is therefore right to consider alternative 
models to seek a more workable solution that better suits the modern world and achieves 
a more even balance in the copyright bargain. It is clearly essential to weigh up the pros 
and cons of all models aiming to solve the ‘public good’ issues in relation to IP, and to 
choose the most socially optimal outcomes, before it is too late to change. 
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